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PERSPECTIVES ON THE ABORTION DECISION

In the 1973 case of State v. Strance,1 the New Mexico Court of
2
Appeals held that the portion of the New Mexico abortion statute
which imposed criminal sanctions on any person who performed an
unjustified medical abortion was unconstitutional. The court held
unconstitutional those parts of the statute which it thought were not
within the standards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court
in Roe v. Wade3 and Doe v. Bolton4 and left intact those portions
which conformed to those standards. Subsequently, the New Mexico
Legislature has passed two abortion related laws. The first of these
laws directs physicians to report any abortions which they perform
to the Department of Vital Statistics.' The other law directs the New
Mexico Board of Medical Examiners to promulgate regulations
governing the standard of care to be exercised with respect to live
aborted fetuses.6 The purpose of this article is to explain the con1. 84 N.M. 670, 506 P.2d 1217 (Ct. App. 1973).
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 30-5-1 to 3 (1978).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-14-18 (1978).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-6-20 (1978). Rule 17, promulgated by the Board of Medical
Examiners, states:
RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TREATMENT OF
INFANTS BORN ALIVE AND EXPERIMENTATION UPON FETUSES
The New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners expects medical practitioners to
utilize proper standards of care as relates to infants born alive.
As necessary for this implementation, the following definitions are adopted:
(A) "Pregnancy" encompasses the period of time from confirmation of
implantation until expulsion or extraction of the fetus.
(B) "Fetus" means the product of conception from the time of implantation until a determination is made, following expulsion or extraction of the
fetus, that it is viable.
(C) "Viable" as it pertains to the fetus means being able, after either
spontaneous or induced delivery, to survive (given the benefit of available
medical therapy) to the point of independently maintaining heartbeat and
respiration.
(D) "Nonviable fetus" means a fetus ex utero which, although living, is
not viable.
Further:
Activities directed toward fetuses ex utero, including nonviable fetuses, as
subjects.
(a) Until it has been ascertained whether or not a fetus ex utero is viable, a
fetus ex utero may not be involved as a subject in an activity covered by this
subpart unless:

NEW MEXICO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 9

stitutional limitations which are applicable to these laws and any
forthcoming legislation. The article does not discuss the funding of
abortions with public funds. It is addressed primarily to New Mexico

legislators in an attempt to explain some of the constitutional considerations surrounding abortion issues.
Presently, the remaining sections of the New Mexico abortion

statute' make it illegal for a physician to perform an abortion without the consent of the woman, or if she is under 18, without the
consent of the woman and her parent or guardian. It also requires
that abortions be performed by a physician licensed by the State of
New Mexico. Even in this limited form, the statute appears to be
unconstitutional in light of.Planned Parenthoodof CentralMissouri v.
Danforth' in which the United States Supreme Court held that a

third party (the parent) may not have an absolute veto power over
the decision of a minor and her physican to terminate her pregnancy.
Accordingly, this article will explore whether a state may regulate in
the following areas, either because they arise under the present New

Mexico statute or because they have arisen under the statutes of
other states: the licensing of physicians, the timing of certain abortion techniques, informed consent provisions, parental consent provisions, spousal consent provisions, recording provisions, and the care

of live-born fetuses.
ROE V. WADE AND DOE V. BOLTON
In the now historic case of Roe v. Wade, 9 the United States

Supreme Court established that a woman has the right to choose to
(1) There will be no added risk to the fetus resulting from the activity,
and
(2) The purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means, or
(3) The purpose of the activity is to enhance the possibility of survival
of the particular fetus to the point of viability.
E. No nonviable fetus may be involved as a subject in an activity covered
by this subpart unless:
(1) Vital functions of the fetus will not be artificially maintained.
(2) Experimental activities which of themselves would terminate the
heartbeat or respiration of the fetus will not be employed, and
(3) The purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.
(4) Written informed consent has been obtained from the mother.
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 30-5-1 to 3 (1978).

8. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
9. In Roe, the Court struck down a Texas abortion statute. In doing so, Justice Blackmun recounted the history of abortion law. It is interesting to note that the state antiabortion laws in effect at the time the decision was rendered were relatively recent in origin.
They were not derived from either ancient law or the common law, but were a product of
late nineteenth century thinking. 410 U.S. at 129.

Winter 1978-79]

PERSPECTIVES ON THE ABORTION DECISION

obtain an abortion. The right is not absolute, but it should be
considered in any new legislation. The Roe Court, in a substantive
due process analysis, first observed that the right to privacy is a
"fundamental" right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It
then determined that the decision by a woman of whether or not to
have an abortion is a personal right encompassed by the right to
privacy. Once the Court finds that a particular right is "fundamental," a state regulation limiting the right may be justified only by a
"compelling state interest." 1
If the state does have a compelling
interest, it may regulate in ways that are reasonably related to the
interest.' 1 But the regulation, even so, must be written to express
only the legitimate state interest which it is advancing.' 2 The Court
reasoned that in regulating abortions, a state's interest in protecting
health cannot become compelling until the end of the first trimester
of pregnancy. Up until that time, according to medical statistics, it is
safer for a woman to have an abortion than it is for her to continue
pregnancy. The state interest in protecting the health of the mother
is therefore minimal until the second trimester. After that time, the
interest becomes compelling and the state may regulate abortions if
the regulation is reasonably related to the interest of maternal health.
The state also has a legitimate interest in protecting the potential
life of the fetus, but this interest becomes compelling only when the
1
fetus becomes viable. 3
Regulations concerning abortions must leave the abortion decision
to the woman and her physician during the first trimester. After the
first trimester, the state, in its interest in maternal health, may
regulate the abortion procedure, but only in ways that are reasonably
related to protecting the woman's health. Once the fetus reaches
viability, the state may then protect the interest of the fetus, and
regulate or even proscribe abortions-except where the life or health
of the mother is endangered. Roe also held that a state may require
that all abortions be performed by a physician licensed in that state,
during any of the trimesters.' '
In Doe v. Bolton, ' a companion decision to Roe v. Wade, the
constitutionality of a Georgia abortion statute was challenged. The
statute required that the hospital where the abortion was to be performed had to be accredited by the Joint Commission on the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 155.
Id at 163.
Id at 155.
Id at 163.
Id at 165.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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Accreditation of Hospitals. The Court found this provision constitutionally impermissible because it was not reasonably related to the
purpose of insuring the quality of the operation and the full protection of the patient. 1 6 The statute also required that the abortion
must first be approved by a hospital staff abortion committee, as
well as two other physicians who had to confirm the need for an
abortion. This requirement was found to be unconstitutional because
the abortion decision should be left to the woman and her physician,
and the challenged provisions did not advance any compelling state
interest.' ' In addition, it unduly infringed upon the physician's right
to practice.' ' Finally, the Court found that a residency requirement
in the statute violated a person's right to travel interstate, and had no
valid justification.' I
These two cases illustrate how limited an abortion statute must be
if it is to survive a test of constitutionality under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Ideally, a statute should make a distinction between
each trimester of pregnancy and regulate accordingly, because the
state's power to regulate is different for each trimester. A state
should also regulate with discretion. Its lawmakers should be aware
that a woman does have a right to decide whether or not to obtain an
abortion, without the state interfering in that process.
STATE REGULATION DURING THE FIRST AND SECOND TRIMESTERS

Requirement That Physician be Licensed
A state may require that the physician performing the abortion be
duly licensed by the state, regardless of which trimester of pregnancy
the woman is in. 2 0 This type of regulation is permissible because the
state has an interest in protecting the health of the woman in general,
as opposed to protecting maternal health. A licensing requirement is
reasonable because it can hardly be argued that an abortion performed by any non-physician would be safer than a continuation of
pregnancy. 2' Consequently, the state's interest extends at least to
the point that it may require that the operation be done by a doctor.
Also, the state infringement is no greater than it would be for any
other medical operation. 2 New Mexico presently requires any
person performing an abortion to be a licensed physician.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 194.
Id. at 197, 199.
Id at 199.
Id. at 200.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165.
Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-6-18 (1978).
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Pregnancy Must be Confirmed Before an Abortion Technique is Used
A state may also require that the physician determine that a
woman is pregnant before performing an abortion. In Planned
Parenthood Ass'n. v. Fitzpatrick," the court found that menstrual
extraction, a procedure sometimes used before there is an actual
confirmation of pregnancy, posed a possible risk to the health of the
woman. It was, therefore, an interest of the state to prevent nonpregnant women from undergoing the abortion procedure. But once
a pregnancy has been confirmed, the state may no longer regulate the
abortion procedure used until the end of the third month.
Informed Consent
The present New Mexico abortion statute2 ' does not require the
informed consent of the pregnant woman. Informed consent generally means that the consent to the abortion be freely given after
the woman is informed of the procedures used and the possible
consequences of the operation.2
The New Mexico statute does
require that the woman request the abortion before the physician
2
may legally perform the operation. 6
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,2
the United
States Supreme Court considered a statute which required a woman
to certify in writing "that her consent is informed and freely given
and is not the result of coercion." '2 Arguably, such a statute has a
chilling effect upon a woman's right to choose an abortion and interferes with the patient-physician relationship. It also requires procedures which are not used in other types of medical operations. 2 9
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, reasoning that written informed consent could be required for many types of operations,
without having to require it for all operations, so the fact that it was
required for abortions and not other operations does not make the
provision unconstitutional. The Court recognized that the state has a
legitimate interest in making sure that the woman is aware of her
decision and its significance, and it may promote that interest to the
extent of requiring her prior written consent. The state's interest
23. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Penn. 1975), aff'd sub. nom., Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428
U.S. 901 (1976).
24. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 30-5-1 to 3 (1978).
25. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67, n. 8 (1976).
26. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 30-5-1 to 3 (1978).
27. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
28. Id at 65.
29. Id.
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apparently stems from the concern that the decision is an important
and stressful one, so it should be made with full knowledge of its
nature and consequences. 3" The Court also quoted a District Court
judge's concurring opinion that the written consent requirement was
" 'not burdensome or chilling' and manifested 'a legitimate interest
of the state that this important decision has in fact been made by the
person constitutionally empowered to do so.' "I'
An informed consent provision, therefore, could be written into
any forthcoming legislation without being constitutionally objectionable, so long as it is limited in its requirements. But if it goes beyond
the state interest being advanced and intereferes with the decisionmaking process of the woman and her physician, the provision may
become not a safeguard but an intrusion. 3 2
ParentalConsent
New Mexico law now requires that minors obtain parental consent
before having an abortion performed. 3 I This particular provision was
challenged in State v. Strance, but the court did not decide whether
it was constitutional or not because the abortion in question was not
performed upon a minor.3 4 The New Mexico provision has not been
challenged since, but it is now reasonably certain that it would be
found unconstitutional. 3 I
Several courts have addressed the parental consent issue, 3 6 and
each, including the United States Supreme Court,3 have found the
30. Id
31. Id.at 66.
32. An example of an impermissible statute is one which was found unconstitutional in
Illinois which stated:
The informed consent shall state that the woman has been informed of the
following:
(a) The physical competency of the fetus at the time the abortion is to be
performed, such as, but not limited to, what the fetus looks like, the fetus'
ability to move, swallow and its physical characteristics;
(b) The general dangers of abortion, including, but not limited to, the
possibility of subsequent sterility, premature birth, live-born fetus and other
dangers; and
(c) The particular dangers of the procedure to be used.
Only sections (a) and (b) were found unconstitutional. Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302,
1978), appeal dismissed; 47 U.S.L.W. 3259.
1316 (N.D. Ill.
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 30-5-1 to 3 (1978).
34. 84 N.M. at 673, 506 P.2d at 1220 (Ct. App. 1973).
35. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (1976).
36. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975); Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847
(D. Mass. 1975); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp.
554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Wolfe v. Schroering, 383 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Coe v.
Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah
1973); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
37. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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statutes to be objectionable. The Supreme Court decided the issue in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth3" where it said
that a-state may not impose a blanket provision which requires the
consent of a parent or guardian as a condition before an abortion
may be performed upon an unmarried minor during the first
trimester of pregnancy.' 9 The Court came to its conclusion by first
determining that a minor is protected by the Constitution and possesses constitutional rights the same as an adult. 4 0 But it also recognized that the state has greater authority in regulating the activities
of children than it does in regulating adults. 4' For this reason, the
state does not need a compelling interest in order to regulate a constitutionally protected right, but needs only a "significant state interest" to justify its intrusion. 4 2
The interests advanced by the state were that the regulation
helped to safeguard the family unit and that it helped enhance the
authority of the parent over the child. But the Court did not believe
that the family unit would be strengthened by such a provision, or
that providing a parent with absolute power to overrule the decision
of the minor and her physician would serve the state's asserted
interest. The Court did not accept the argument that parental authority would be enhanced by the regulation because the non-consenting
parent and the minor are already in a fundamental conflict, and the
family structure has already been "fractured" by the pregnancy. 4 3 It
was also noted that the independent interest of the parent in the
abortion decision was no more weighty than the right of privacy
which the minor, who is mature enough to become pregnant, is
guaranteed under the Constitution. 4 In effect then, a state may not
allow a parent to override the decision of the minor and her physician. It was emphasized, however, that the case does not stand for
the proposition that "every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may
give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy.

'

'

The issue is again before the Court in Bellotti v. Baird,4 6 where
the Court will be reviewing the decision of a three-judge District
Court which found a Massachusetts parental consent statute invalid. 4 The Bellotti case has an interesting procedural background
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id
Id at 74.
Id
Id
Id at 75.
Id
Id.
Id.
47 U.S.L.W. 3292 (review granted).
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978).
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in that it has been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court
once before.4 8 Previously, the Court vacated a district court judgment holding the statute unconstitutional, because the Massachusetts
Supreme Court had not yet construed the statute.4 I The statute was
then certified to the state supreme court' 0 which interpreted the
statute as allowing a judge to give consent to an abortion for a minor
where it is shown that, in spite of the disapproval of one or both
parents, the best interests of the minor will be served if the abortion
is performed. The statute also requires parental consultation unless it
is an emergency or the parents are not available.' I The district court
again found the statute unconstitutional,' 2 and the Supreme Court
will again be reviewing its decision.5 3 Hopefully, the Supreme Court
will enunciate guidelines for states to follow in this area.
Spousal Consent
A state abortion statute which would require a husband's consent
to an abortion during the first trimester would also be impermissible.
Such a statute might be justified on the grounds that the state has an
interest in regulating the marriage relationship and that it has an
interest in protecting the rights of a husband. The Supreme Court has
accepted neither argument, at least as applied to the first trimester of
pregnancy.
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the
Supreme Court agreed with a dissent to the lower court decision. The
Court reasoned that the state may not delegate a veto power to the
spouse during the first trimester when the state itself does not have
the authority to veto the woman's decision.5 ' The Court further
stated that such a regulation would be an intrusion into the privacy
associated with marriage.'5
The Court recognized that the husband does have an interest in his
wife's pregnancy and his potential child, but this interest is outweighed by the wife's interest. Where the two partners are in a disagreement such as this, one of the partners must prevail and the
Court determined that it should be the wife. She is more directly
affected by the pregnancy; it is she who must face the attendant
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
Id at 152.
-,
Baird v. Attorney General, -Mass.
Id. at 293.
450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978).
47 U.S.L.W. 3292 (review granted).
428 U.S. at 69.
Id at 70, n. 10.

360 N.E.2d 288 (1977).
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risks. The husband may not have a unilateral veto power conferred
upon him by the state.
If the decisions regarding parental and spousal consent are read
narrowly, they would be applicable only during the first trimester of
pregnancy.' 6 During the second trimester, a state may only regulate
in ways which are reasonably related to maternal health and it is hard
to discern how a spousal veto power is related to maternal health.5 7
Even if the third-party interests do not necessarily need to follow the
same criteria as a state's interest, the cases suggest that third parties
cannot exercise rights in the decision-making process which the state
does not have.' I Moreover, a statute requiring spousal consent may
be overbroad if it does not distinguish between a spouse who is the
father of the fetus and one who is not.5I Additionally, a situation
where the spouse cannot be located to give his consent may be
envisioned. Consequently, a state is well advised not to require
spousal consent during the first two trimesters of pregnancy.

THIRD TRIMESTER REGULATION
Viability
In Roe v. Wade the Court divided the period of a woman's pregnancy into trimesters for the purpose of regulation. The first trimester and the second trimester were distinguished from each other
because of the relative hazards of an abortion as opposed to continuing pregnancy. The third trimester was said to be distinct from
the second trimester because that is the approximate time at which
viability of the fetus occurs. In Roe, the Court determined that the
state may regulate or even proscribe abortions after the point of
viability.' 0 Viability is the time after which a fetus is capable of
"meaningful life" outside the mother's womb. 6' The state's interest
in protecting the fetus becomes "compelling" at that point, so it may
regulate in an area protected by the right to privacy.
In Danforth, a statute which defined viability as "that stage of
fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be con56. See Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
57. "It is of some interest to note that the condition does not relate, as most statutory
conditions in this area do, to the preservation of the life or health of the mother." Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 68, n. 9 (1976).
58. Id. at 69.
59. Id. at 68-69.
60. 410 U.S. at 163, 164.

61. Id at 163.

184
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tinued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial lifesupportive systems" was challenged. 6 2 The Supreme Court upheld
the provision as being in accordance with the standards enuniciated
in Roe. 6 3 This indicates that a statute does not need to set a definite
time period defining the time at which viability occurs, but may
leave this decision to the attending physician. The Supreme Court, in
fact, stated:
It is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to place
viability, which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in
the gestation period. The time when viability is achieved may vary
with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particular

fetus is viable is, and must be,6 4a matter for the judgment of the

responsible attending physician.

The Board of Medical Examiners for the State of New Mexico has
defined viability as the point at which a fetus is able, "after either
spontaneous or induced delivery, to survive (given the benefit of
available medical therapy) to the point of independently maintaining
heartbeat and respiration." '6 1 While this definition would probably
survive a test of constitutionality, it is unclear whether the term
"available" means at the specific time and place where the abortion
was performed or whether it means therapy generally available to the
medical community.
Physician's Standard of Care
A state may prescribe the standard of care to be exercised with
regard to aborted but viable fetuses. 6 6 In Danforth, the Supreme
Court considered a statute which required the physician to exercise:
that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the
life and health of the fetus which such person would be required to
exercise in order to preserve61the life and health of any fetus intended
to be born and not aborted.
The statute was found unconstitutional because it failed to specify
that the standard only applied to a fetus which is viable. New Mexico
has a statute which requires the Board of Medical Examiners to "set
forth the standard of care for infants born alive."' 6 8 A problem could
62. 428 U.S. at 63.
63. Id.
64. Id at 64.
65. Rule 17, supra note 6.
66. Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. II. 1978).
67. 428 U.S. at 82.
68. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-6-20 (1978).
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occur because the statute's definition for live-birth is not the same as
viability, and would include non-viable fetuses. The Board has not
promulgated a standard to be applied towards viable fetuses, however, except concerning experimentation.
RELATED ISSUES

Recording Requirements
The Danforth case also addressed the issue of whether a state may
require that records of all abortions be kept by the attending
physician. The challenged statute required that the name of the
pregnant woman be recorded, but it also provided that the records be
kept confidential. The Court indicated that a recording statute such
as this is constitutional so long as it is not abused or overdone. It is
questionable whether this result would have been reached if there had
not been a confidentiality provision. If the records were left open to
public scrutiny, a recording requirement might unduly interfere with
a woman's decision because of the stigma attached to the procedure.
New Mexico presently requires that a report of each induced
abortion which is performed in the state be filed with the Department of Vital Statistics by the physician performing the abortion or
by the institution where it was performed. 6 9 It is not permissible for
the report to include the names or addresses of either the patient or
the physician. This type of requirement is less subject to abuse than
the one considered in Danforth, and would also be an insignificant
intrusion into the woman's decision. The New Mexico recording
statute, therefore, is undoubtedly constitutional under the present
standards.
Regulation of Institutions
Regulations governing abortion clinics which give first trimester
abortions would probably be unconstitutional, as violative of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, unless the
regulations are applied equally to all types of medical clinics. 7" The
regulation of abortion clinics may also be invalid simply because it is
an unwarranted interference by the state into the decision of the
physician and the patient. 7' Types of regulations which have been
held invalid are those which required that the first trimester abortion
be performed in a hospital or licensed health facility; 7 2 those which
69.
70.
1974)
71.
72.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-14-18 (1978).
Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir.
cert. denied 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
Arnold v. Sendak, 416 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Ind. 1976) aff'd 429 U.S. 969 (1976).
Id at 22-23.
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regulated, in detail, conditions, equipment and procedures that abortion facilities must comply with;7 and a regulation which required
that the abortion clinic have a transfer agreement with a local hospital and an emergency transportation service which would assure
7
that the patient could be taken to a hospital within 15 minutes. 1
Such regulations may be permissible, however, if they are applied
only during the second and third trimesters of pregnancy and are
reasonably related to maternal health or fetal health considerations,
respectively.
CONCLUSION

Abortion statutes should reflect the three stages of pregnancy in
order to differentiate between the allowable considerations for each
trimester. During the first trimester, the state may not interfere with
a woman's right to choose to obtain an abortion. 75 During the
second and third trimesters of pregnancy, the state may regulate in
the interest of maternal health, but the regulations must be reasonably related to that interest and cannot be overbroad. 7 6 As soon as
the fetus reaches viability, the state may regulate abortions in the
interest of the potential life of the fetus, even to the extent of
proscribing the operation unless the life or health of the mother is
endangered. 7" These considerations apply regardless of the age or
marital status of the woman. Emotions and political controversy surround the abortion issues, but nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Constitution as guaranteeing a woman's right to make
the abortion decision free from state interference.
CHARLES FULTON NOBLE
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